Hey everyone, welcome back to My Weird Prompts. We are coming to you from a very rainy Jerusalem today, and honestly, it is the perfect weather to sit down and dig into some complex geopolitics. The stone walls of the Old City look almost silver in this light, but the mood is definitely heavy. I am Corn, and I am joined as always by my brother.
Herman Poppleberry here. And you are right, Corn, the rain definitely sets the mood for a deep dive. I have been staring at maps, flight path data, and satellite imagery all morning, so I am primed for this one. There is something about the sound of rain on the window that makes you want to look at the "plumbing" of the world, the stuff that usually stays hidden beneath the surface of the daily news cycle.
Well, that is good, because today's prompt from Daniel is about something we have lived through recently and that has really reshaped how we think about the Middle East. He wants to talk about the international alliance that formed during the twelve day war with Iran and those massive ballistic missile attacks we saw back in two thousand twenty-four. Specifically, he is asking about the mechanics of it. Was this a quietly negotiated contingency plan, or was there actually room for spontaneity when the missiles started flying?
This is such a fantastic question because it touches on the difference between what we see in the headlines and the actual reality of international military cooperation. When you see a Royal Air Force Typhoon taking off from Akrotiri in Cyprus to intercept a Shahed drone over the Jordanian desert, that is not just a pilot deciding to be a hero on the fly. But at the same time, the fog of war is real. You can have all the plans in the world, and then the reality of a thousand drones and missiles in the air changes everything. You are moving from a spreadsheet to a survival situation in a matter of seconds.
Right, and I think for a lot of people, the sight of Jordan, an Arab nation, actively participating in the defense of Israeli airspace was the big shocker. It felt like a massive shift in the regional tectonic plates. But before we get into the spontaneity versus planning debate, let us set the stage for Daniel. When we talk about the twelve day war, which for our listeners occurred just last year in late two thousand twenty-five, and the preceding attacks in April of two thousand twenty-four, what were the actual moving parts of this alliance?
It was really an ad hoc coalition that functioned like a well-oiled machine, which is a paradox in itself. You had the United States Central Command, or CENTCOM, acting as the primary conductor of the orchestra. They were the ones holding the baton. Then you had Israel's own multi-layered defense system—Iron Dome, David's Sling, and the Arrow three. But the "weird" part, or the part that felt new to the public, was the involvement of the United Kingdom, France, and most notably, Jordan and several other regional partners who were less public about their roles. We are talking about a sensor net that stretched from the Persian Gulf all the way to the Mediterranean.
And the Royal Air Force, the RAF, was operating out of Akrotiri in Cyprus, right? I remember seeing the footage of the Typhoons taking off into the night. It looked like something out of a movie.
Exactly. And that is a great place to start looking at the "planning" aspect. The United Kingdom has had a presence in Cyprus for decades, but the specific mission of intercepting Iranian assets bound for Israel required very specific legal and operational frameworks. You do not just fly into another country's sovereign airspace to shoot things down without a very, very long paper trail. The RAF was operating under Operation Shader, which was originally about fighting ISIS, but the mission parameters were expanded. That expansion did not happen overnight. It was the result of months of "what if" scenarios discussed in Whitehall and at the Pentagon.
That is what I was thinking. If you are Jordan, and you have these Iranian drones and missiles screaming through your sky, you are in a tough spot. You do not want them hitting your own people, but you also do not want to be seen as "Israel's shield" in a way that causes domestic unrest. So, Herman, when Daniel asks if this was quietly negotiated, what does the research say? Was there a "In Case of Iranian Attack" binder sitting on a desk in Amman and Tel Aviv?
There almost certainly was. But it was not just a bilateral thing between Israel and Jordan. It was part of what has been called the Middle East Air Defense alliance, or MEAD. This is something that has been in the works since the Abraham Accords in two thousand twenty. The United States has been pushing for what they call "integrated air and missile defense" for years. In two thousand twenty-two, the U.S. Congress actually passed the DEFEND Act, which specifically mandated a strategy for this kind of cooperation. The idea is that if Iran launches a massive attack, no single country can track and stop everything. You need a "sensor net" where a radar in one country talks to a missile battery in another. So, the "quiet negotiation" was actually quite loud if you knew where to look in the legislative records.
So, when the first drones were detected in April of two thousand twenty-four, and then again during the high-intensity twelve day war last year, the "spontaneity" was actually just the execution of a pre-existing script?
Mostly, yes. But here is where it gets interesting and where Daniel's question about spontaneity really hits home. Even if you have a plan that says "Jordan will allow the RAF to use its airspace," the actual decision to pull the trigger is a political one that happens in real-time. During the two thousand twenty-four attacks, the Jordanian government had to make a split-second decision: do we stay out of it and let these objects violate our sovereignty, or do we engage? They chose to engage, stating they were protecting their own citizens. That is the "spontaneous" political courage layered on top of the "planned" military infrastructure. They used the language of sovereignty to justify the act of cooperation.
It is like having the blueprints for a house but waiting for the storm to hit before you decide to actually lock the doors. I am curious about the technical side of that coordination, though. You mentioned CENTCOM as the conductor. How does that actually work? If I am a Jordanian radar operator, am I talking directly to an Israeli officer? Because that still feels like a bridge too far for some of these governments.
That is the million-dollar question, and it is where the "weirdness" of the prompt really shines. Traditionally, that direct line was a huge "no." For decades, there was no direct line. But what we saw in these recent conflicts suggests that the United States has built a sort of "clearinghouse" for data. Think of it like a giant chat room or a shared digital map where everyone sees the same thing, but they might not be talking directly to each other. The United States takes the data from a radar in, say, a Gulf country, cleans it up, strips away the sensitive "source" data, and passes it to an Israeli interceptor battery and a British Typhoon pilot simultaneously. It is called "Link sixteen" on steroids.
So, the alliance is "informal" in the sense that there is no mutual defense treaty like NATO, but "formal" in the sense that the hardware is literally plugged into the same socket.
Exactly. It is a "coalition of the willing" powered by American middleware. And that is why it could come together so quickly. But let us look at the RAF for a second, because that is another layer Daniel mentioned. The British involvement was quite extensive. They were not just shooting down drones; they were providing Voyager refueling tankers and Shadow R-one intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. That requires a massive amount of coordination. You have to have the tankers in the right "orbit" so the fighters do not run out of gas while waiting for the drones to arrive.
And that is not something you just "do." You have to have the fuel, the pilots on standby, and the rules of engagement cleared by London. I imagine the legal team at the Ministry of Defence was working just as hard as the pilots.
Right. And "Rules of Engagement" or ROE, are where the spontaneity really dies. A pilot cannot just decide to fire a missile because they feel like it. They have to have specific authorization that says "if a drone enters this box, you are cleared to engage." During the twelve day war, those boxes were likely drawn and redrawn every few hours. The spontaneity was in the tactical adjustment. If a drone swarm changed course toward a Jordanian population center, the "plan" had to allow the pilot to follow it without waiting for a call back to London.
Okay, but what about the surprises? In any war, things go wrong. During the twelve day war in twenty twenty-five, there must have been moments where the "plan" did not cover the reality. I remember reports of the sheer volume of fire being unprecedented.
Oh, absolutely. One of the most fascinating things that came out of the analysis of the twelve day war was how the coalition handled "saturation." Iran's strategy was to overwhelm the sensors. They sent so many cheap drones that the "plan" for who shoots what could have easily broken down. There were reports of Israeli and American jets almost bumping into each other in the same "kill box" because the sheer volume of targets was so high. That is where the spontaneity comes in—the tactical level. Pilots and mid-level commanders making decisions on the fly because the script did not account for five hundred targets in one sector. They had to "deconflict" the airspace in real-time while moving at Mach one.
That sounds incredibly stressful. You are flying at night, there are hundreds of explosive drones around you, and you are trying not to accidentally shoot down a partner's jet or a civilian aircraft that wandered into the wrong place. I mean, the civilian air traffic over the region did not just stop instantly.
It is the ultimate high-stakes video game, but with real lives. And it is worth noting that during the ballistic missile phase of the two thousand twenty-four attacks, the speed of the targets meant there was zero room for debate. A ballistic missile from Iran reaches Israel in about twelve minutes. If you are going to intercept it over Jordan or Iraq, you have a window of maybe two or three minutes to make that call. That is where the "quietly negotiated" part is vital. You cannot call the Prime Minister for permission when the missile is already at Mach five. The permission has to be pre-delegated.
So the "spontaneity" is actually delegated authority. The politicians say "yes" months in advance so the soldiers can say "yes" in seconds. It is a pre-authorized reaction.
That is a perfect way to put it. It is "pre-approved spontaneity." But I want to go back to Daniel's point about Jordan. Why do you think it feels so different this time? We have seen "quiet" cooperation before, but this was very loud. Jordan's air force was literally in the news for shooting these things down. Their pilots were being hailed as heroes in some circles and criticized in others.
Well, I think part of it is the changing nature of the threat. In the past, Israel's wars were mostly with its immediate neighbors. Now, the threat is regional and it is coming from over the horizon. If you are Jordan, you are literally the "land bridge" between Iran and Israel. You cannot afford to be a passive bystander because if a missile fails or is intercepted poorly, it lands on your cities. We saw that in two thousand twenty-four—shrapnel falling in Amman. But there is also the political signaling. By helping, Jordan is signaling to the United States that they are an indispensable strategic partner. They are saying, "Look what we can do that no one else can." It is about maintaining that special relationship with Washington.
And it is also a signal to Iran. It is saying, "Our airspace is not your highway." That is a very strong sovereign statement. But it is risky. We saw a lot of "informal" signals from other countries too. Some countries didn't shoot anything down but they "opened their eyes." They turned their radar systems toward Iran and shared that data with the Americans. That is a form of alliance that is almost impossible to see from the outside but is absolutely critical for the "sensor net" I mentioned. Without those "eyes" in the Gulf, the RAF and the Israelis would have had much less warning time.
This makes me think about the future of these "informal alliances." If they worked so well during the twelve day war, do you think we are moving toward a more formal "Middle East NATO"? Or is the "informal" nature actually its biggest strength? Because once you put a name on it, it becomes a target for every protest and every opposition party.
I think the informality is the secret sauce. In the Middle East, a formal treaty is a political nightmare. It creates targets for domestic opposition and makes you look like a "vassal" of a foreign power. But an "informal" agreement to share radar data or allow "humanitarian" use of airspace? That is much easier to defend politically. It is the "don't ask, don't tell" of military alliances. As long as it works, nobody needs to sign a piece of paper in a rose garden. The twelve day war proved that you can have NATO-level integration without the NATO-level bureaucracy.
It is interesting because it is almost like the technology has outpaced the diplomacy. We have the technical ability to link these countries together through satellite links and AI-driven battle management systems, but the diplomatic "software" is still running on an old version that does not allow for open cooperation.
That is exactly it. We are running "Alliance two point zero" on a "Diplomacy one point zero" operating system. And that brings up another point Daniel made about the buildup. We are seeing it again now—force buildups, signaling, carriers moving into the region. It feels like everyone is rehearsing for the next "twelve day war." The USS Abraham Lincoln and the USS Theodore Roosevelt were both in the region recently, and that is not just for show. They are part of the "calibration."
And that rehearsal is part of the "planning" Daniel asked about. Every time the United States moves a carrier strike group or deploys a THAAD battery—that is Terminal High Altitude Area Defense for those who don't know—they are essentially "calibrating" the alliance. They are checking the connections. "Hey, if we put this battery here, can your radar in the north see what it sees?" It is a live-fire exercise in diplomacy.
Right. And we should talk about that THAAD battery because that was a huge deal in late two thousand twenty-four and again during the escalation in twenty twenty-five. The United States sent one to Israel, operated by American troops. That is a massive "formal" step in an "informal" war. It says to Iran, "If you hit this battery, you are hitting the United States Army." That is the ultimate signal. It removes the "spontaneity" of an Iranian attack because they know exactly what the American response will be.
It is a tripwire.
Exactly. A multi-billion dollar, high-tech tripwire. But let us look at the "spontaneity" from the Iranian side for a second. Their attacks were also signaled. In April two thousand twenty-four, they practically gave a seventy-two hour head start. That allowed the alliance to "spontaneously" get into position. It was almost like a choreographed dance. "We are going to attack, you are going to defend, and hopefully, no one gets so hurt that we have to start a world war." It was a controlled escalation.
But the twelve day war was different. That felt less like a dance and more like a brawl. There was no seventy-two hour warning there.
Much more. The "spontaneity" there was much more desperate. When Iran realized the "April model" of signaling didn't work to penetrate the defenses, they started changing their tactics in real-time. They started using different flight paths, different timing, trying to find gaps in the "sensor net." They used low-flying cruise missiles that hugged the terrain to avoid radar. And the alliance had to respond. That is where you saw the RAF and the United States Air Force doing things that were definitely not in the pre-negotiated script.
Like what? Give me some of that "nerdy" detail you love.
Like "emergency cross-decking" or sharing fuel in ways that were not standard. There were reports of tankers from one nation refueling fighters from another because the original tankers were forced to move due to incoming threats. Or pilots taking initiative to pursue targets into areas that were technically "gray zones" because they knew the "sensor net" would cover them. There were reports of Jordanian pilots and Israeli pilots essentially "handing off" targets at the border like a relay race. That requires a level of trust that you cannot build in a meeting room. It has to be built in the cockpit, through shared experience.
That is a really powerful image. Two pilots from countries that do not even have a "warm" peace, working together to stop a common threat. It makes you wonder how much of this "alliance" is actually just a few hundred highly professional people who decided that the mission was more important than the politics. It is the "professionalism" gap.
I think that is a huge part of it. We often talk about "countries" doing things, but countries are just groups of people. And at the military level, there is a shared language. A pilot in the RAF and a pilot in the Royal Jordanian Air Force have more in common with each other than they do with the average person on the street. They understand the physics of the threat. They understand the stakes. When a drone is heading toward a city, the politics of the border matter a lot less than the range of your missile.
So, to Daniel's question: was it planned or spontaneous? It sounds like the "hardware" was planned, but the "software"—the human trust and the quick decisions—was spontaneous. It is a hybrid model.
I would agree with that. But I would add one more category: "Contingent Spontaneity." This is the idea that you train so hard for every possible scenario that when something "new" happens, your "spontaneous" reaction is actually just a variation of a thousand things you have already practiced. The RAF didn't "spontaneously" decide to help; they had practiced "Expeditionary Air Operations" for years. Jordan didn't "spontaneously" decide to defend its sky; they had practiced "Sovereign Air Defense" for decades. What was spontaneous was the alignment of those two things at the exact same moment under the pressure of a real attack.
It is like jazz. You have to know the scales and the structure perfectly before you can truly improvise. If you do not know the scales, the improvisation is just noise.
Herman Poppleberry loves a good music analogy! Yes, it is exactly like jazz. The "Middle East Security Jazz Ensemble." It is a weird, dangerous, and incredibly complex performance. And the United States is the one providing the stage and the sound system.
I want to dig a bit deeper into the "why" of the RAF's involvement. Why Cyprus? Why the RAF? Why not just let the Americans and Israelis handle it? They certainly have the numbers.
Well, Cyprus is the unsinkable aircraft carrier of the Mediterranean. From Akrotiri, you can reach the entire Levant in minutes. But the "why" of the British involvement is more about "burden sharing" and legitimacy. If it is just the United States and Israel, it looks like a "Zionist-Imperialist" project to some. But if the United Kingdom is there, and France is there, and Jordan is there... suddenly it is an "International Coalition for Regional Stability." It changes the narrative. It makes it harder for Iran to claim they are only fighting one enemy. They are fighting a consensus.
And the British have a lot of skin in the game in the region, historically and currently. They have significant interests in the Gulf. If the Middle East goes up in flames, the British economy takes a massive hit. Energy prices, shipping lanes—it all matters to London.
Absolutely. And let us not forget the intelligence side. The British GCHQ and the American NSA have facilities in Cyprus that are legendary. They were likely "seeing" the Iranian launch commands before the missiles even left the ground. That "pre-warning" is what allows for the "spontaneity." If you know the attack is coming at ten-oh-five PM, you can "spontaneously" have your jets in the air at ten-oh-four. It looks like magic to the outsider, but it is just good data.
It is funny how "spontaneity" in the military often just means "we had better intel than you realized." It is the illusion of the quick reflex.
Exactly. "Magic" is just science we don't understand yet, and "spontaneity" in war is often just "intelligence" the public hasn't heard about. During the twelve day war, the "intelligence" was likely being shared in real-time through those "middleware" systems I mentioned.
I'm thinking about the "informal" part of this again. Daniel mentioned Jordan and the RAF, but what about the "unnamed" partners? We have heard rumors about Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates during both the two thousand twenty-four and twenty twenty-five events. How do they fit into this "planned versus spontaneous" dynamic?
That is where it gets really "quietly negotiated." If you are a country like Saudi Arabia, you are in a very delicate position. You are the custodian of the two holy mosques. You cannot be seen to be "allied" with Israel in a traditional sense. But you also see Iran as a primary existential threat. So, what do you do? You "spontaneously" fail to notice that Israeli or American jets are using a small corner of your airspace. Or you "spontaneously" share a radar feed because of a "technical glitch" that happens to benefit the coalition. We saw reports that Saudi Arabia provided vital tracking data during the April two thousand twenty-four attack.
It is the "oops" school of diplomacy. "Oops, did we just help you stop a ballistic missile? My bad!"
Haha, yes! But in all seriousness, that kind of cooperation is deeply planned. It requires "Deconfliction Agreements." You have to make sure your own air defenses don't shoot down the people who are trying to help you. That is incredibly technical. You need "Identification Friend or Foe," or IFF codes, that work across different systems. That is not something you do on the fly. That is months of engineers sitting in windowless rooms in Riyadh and Washington making sure the "handshakes" work. If you don't plan that, you end up shooting down your own allies.
So, when Daniel asks if it was quietly negotiated, the answer for the Gulf states is a resounding "yes." It had to be. Otherwise, you would have "blue-on-blue" incidents where allies are shooting each other down in the middle of a crisis.
Right. And the fact that we didn't see any major "blue-on-blue" incidents during the two thousand twenty-four attacks or the twelve day war is the biggest proof that the planning was world-class. To have that many different air forces—U.S., U.K., French, Israeli, Jordanian—in a relatively small space, at night, under fire, without hitting each other? That is a miracle of planning, not spontaneity. It shows that the "Middle East Air Defense" is a reality, even if it doesn't have a flag or a headquarters.
Let us talk about the "takeaways" for a bit. If I am a listener and I am hearing all this, what does it mean for the world? Does this mean we are safer because this alliance exists? Or does it mean the "sides" are just becoming more entrenched? Because it feels like we are building two massive, high-tech camps.
It is a bit of both. On one hand, the "Shield" worked. The fact that ninety-nine percent of the targets were intercepted in April of two thousand twenty-four was a stunning success. It showed that defense can actually win against a massive, state-level attack. That is a deterrent. It tells Iran, "You can spend billions on missiles, but they won't hit anything." That should, in theory, lead to more stability.
But it also raises the stakes. If Iran knows their current missiles won't work, they might "spontaneously" decide to try something even more radical next time. Hypersonic missiles, more advanced electronic warfare, or even more decentralized swarms.
Exactly. It's an arms race of "measures and counter-measures." But the real "takeaway" is the regional architecture. We are seeing the birth of a "New Middle East" that isn't based on peace treaties, but on shared security interests. It is a "Security First" model. And honestly, for a region that has been defined by conflict for a century, a "Security First" model where countries actually work together to stop missiles is a huge step forward. It is a pragmatic peace.
It's a "Cold Peace" but with a very "Hot Defense." I think that is the phrase that sticks with me.
I like that. A "Cold Peace with a Hot Defense." And for the people living here in Jerusalem, or in Amman, or in Nicosia, that "Hot Defense" is the difference between life and death. When you hear the sirens go off, you are counting on that "quietly negotiated" plan to work. You are counting on a pilot you will never meet to make a "spontaneous" decision to pull the trigger.
I want to go back to the RAF for a second because I think people underestimate the "reach" of a country like the United Kingdom in these situations. They aren't a "superpower" in the way the United States is, but they have these "nodes" like Cyprus that give them outsized influence. It is a very specific kind of power.
That is the "Global Britain" strategy in action. It is about being a "Force Multiplier." The UK doesn't need a thousand jets; they just need fifty jets in the right place at the right time with the right intelligence. And by being part of the coalition, they get a seat at the table when the "Day After" plans are being discussed. They aren't just "helping Israel"; they are "shaping the region." They are ensuring that the post-war order includes British interests.
And it's a great training ground for them, too. Not that you want a war for training, but the operational experience gained during the twelve day war is something you can't get in a simulator. The data they collected must be incredible.
Oh, the data! Think about the electronic warfare data. Every time an Iranian drone is launched, it's emitting signals. The RAF and the Americans were scooping all of that up with their RC-one hundred thirty-five Rivet Joint planes. They now know more about Iranian drone technology than almost anyone outside of Tehran. They know the frequencies, the guidance systems, the weaknesses. That "spontaneous" involvement leads to "planned" superiority in the future. It is a massive intelligence harvest.
It's a feedback loop. The more you defend, the more you learn, and the better you can plan for the next time.
Exactly. It is an iterative process.
So, Herman, if you had to give Daniel a final answer on the "spontaneity" versus "planning" scale, where do you land? If zero is "completely random" and ten is "scripted by a supercomputer," where was the twelve day war alliance?
I'd give it an eight point five. The "script" was there, the "hardware" was there, and the "legal frameworks" were there. But that last one point five—that was the "Human Element." That was the Jordanian pilot deciding to engage despite the political risk, the British commander at Akrotiri managing a crisis when a tanker failed, and the Israeli technicians working forty-eight hours straight to reload interceptors. You can't plan for "Grit." You can only hope it's there when you need it. And in twenty twenty-four and twenty twenty-five, it was there.
I think that's a really fair assessment. It's the "Grit" that fills the gaps in the "Plan." And maybe that is what Daniel was sensing—that there is still something human and unpredictable at the center of all this high-tech machinery.
Well said, Corn. And I think it's also important to remember that these "informal alliances" are fragile. They depend on the political wind. If the government in London or Amman changes, the "plan" might stay the same, but the "spontaneous" willingness to execute it might vanish. We saw that tension in the UK parliament during the twelve day war—lots of debate about the extent of the involvement.
That's the scary part. We are relying on these "informal" systems that could evaporate if the politics get too messy. It is a high-wire act without a safety net.
Which is why the "quietly negotiated" part is so important. You want to build systems that are so integrated that it's harder to "unplug" them than it is to keep them running. You want the "default" to be cooperation. You want the radar handshake to happen automatically before the politician can even pick up the phone.
Like a habit. A survival habit.
Exactly. We are trying to make "Regional Defense" a habit in the Middle East. And the twelve day war was a very, very intense "habit-forming" event. It forced everyone to see that they are in the same boat, whether they like it or not.
Well, I think we have covered a lot of ground here. From the "Middle East Air Defense" to the "oops" school of diplomacy and the "Grit" that fills the gaps. It's a lot to process, especially with the rain coming down outside. It makes the world feel a bit smaller, doesn't it?
It does. But I think it's one of the most important stories of our time. It's about how the world actually works when the chips are down. It's less about the speeches at the United Nations and more about the radar handshakes over the desert. It is about the plumbing.
Definitely. And for our listeners, I hope this gives you a bit more "insider" perspective on those headlines from last year. It wasn't just "luck" that the missiles didn't hit; it was a massive, hidden architecture of cooperation that has been years in the making.
A "Weird Prompt" indeed, Daniel. Thanks for that. It really forced us to look at the "plumbing" of the war. It is easy to look at the explosions, but the real story is in the connections.
Before we wrap up, I just want to say, if you are enjoying these deep dives into the weird and complex world we live in, we would really appreciate it if you could leave us a review. Whether you are on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your fix, a quick rating or a few words really helps other curious minds find the show. It makes a huge difference for an independent podcast like ours.
It really does. We love seeing the community grow and hearing your feedback. And remember, you can always find us at myweirdprompts dot com. We have the full archive there, including some of our earlier episodes on the Abraham Accords and regional tech, which provide some good context for today's discussion. We even have some maps and diagrams of the "sensor net" if you want to get really nerdy with me.
And if you have a prompt of your own—something that's been bugging you or a "what if" scenario you want us to tackle—send it over to show at myweirdprompts dot com. We love hearing from you. Daniel's prompt today was a great example of how a specific question can lead to a much bigger conversation.
We really do. This has been My Weird Prompts. I am Herman Poppleberry.
And I am Corn. Thanks for listening, stay dry out there, and we will catch you in the next one.
Goodbye everyone! Keep those prompts coming!
