Daniel sent us this one — he's asking about the October seventh Hamas invasion, specifically what we've learned since about how long the operation was actually in planning. Not the immediate tactical preparations Israeli intelligence missed in the weeks before, but when the first seeds were planted. He also wants to know how Hamas maintained compartmentalization while permanently wary of Israeli infiltration, and whether ordinary Gazans would have been surprised by what they saw that morning — or if there's evidence awareness was more widespread than we'd expect. There's a lot to unpack here.
It's worth unpacking, because the planning timeline question has gotten sharper answers in the last couple years than it had in the immediate aftermath. The early assumption — I remember this in the first weeks — was maybe a year, eighteen months of detailed planning. That turned out to be off by a lot.
Try a decade. Yahya Sinwar, who was the architect of this — and the IDF confirmed this through interrogations of captured Hamas commanders — Sinwar began sketching the operational concept around twenty fourteen, right after the Protective Edge war. He was still in an Israeli prison at that point, by the way. He got released in the twenty eleven Shalit deal, rearrested, released again. But the point is, the intellectual architecture of October seventh began while he was watching that twenty fourteen conflict from a cell and concluding that Hamas's tunnel-and-rocket strategy would never produce a strategic breakthrough.
The guy's in prison, watching a war he can't participate in, and he's mentally drafting what becomes the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. There's something darkly ironic about the Israeli prison system being the think tank.
It's more than ironic — it's a known pattern. Israeli prisons have historically functioned as Hamas university. Sinwar learned Hebrew in prison. He studied Israeli society, Israeli media, Israeli political fault lines. Former Shin Bet interrogators have said he was one of the most formidable minds they'd ever sat across from. He wasn't just passing time. He was conducting research.
Twenty fourteen is the conceptual seed. When does it become an actual plan?
The reporting that's emerged — and there was a remarkable Reuters investigation on this about a year ago, plus extensive Israeli military intelligence post-mortems — points to formal planning beginning around twenty sixteen to twenty seventeen. That's when Sinwar, now out of prison and rising in Hamas's political bureau, starts convening a very small circle. We're talking maybe five to seven people who know the full scope. And they begin war-gaming a multi-axis ground invasion.
Five to seven people over what becomes a seven-year planning cycle. That's the compartmentalization answer right there.
And I want to get into that, because the mechanics of it are genuinely fascinating from an intelligence perspective. But first let me finish the timeline. By twenty nineteen, they had a detailed operational plan. They ran tabletop exercises. They built a mock Israeli kibbutz in Gaza to train on. Satellite imagery later confirmed this — there was a training facility with replica structures. And then the question became: when? And the answer Sinwar settled on was: not yet. Build more capability. Let Israeli complacency deepen.
Seven years of sitting on a fully-formed plan. Most organizations can't keep a secret for seven minutes.
Which brings us to the compartmentalization question. How did they do it? The short answer is: radical cell-based structure that drew on lessons Hamas learned the hard way. In the early two thousands, Israeli intelligence had deeply penetrated Hamas's military wing. They'd lost senior commanders to targeted killings because operational details circulated too widely. Sinwar and Mohammed Deif — who was the military commander and the other key architect — built a system where almost nobody knew the full picture.
What did that look like in practice?
Think concentric circles. The innermost circle — Sinwar, Deif, and maybe three or four others — knew this was a large-scale invasion of southern Israel involving thousands of fighters breaching the border fence at multiple points, with the objective of seizing territory and taking hostages. The next circle out — unit commanders — knew their specific axis of attack and their specific objectives, but not that it was part of a coordinated multi-front operation. They may have thought they were training for a large raid, or a border clash escalation scenario. The outer circle — the rank-and-file fighters — were told nothing until the night before, and even then, many were told they were conducting a training exercise or a limited hostage-taking operation.
You've got a guy practicing breaching a replica fence for months, and he doesn't know whether he's doing a raid or an invasion.
And this layered ignorance was deliberate. It meant that if any single fighter or mid-level commander was flipped by Israeli intelligence, the information they could provide was bounded. They could reveal their own training, their own unit's movements, but they couldn't reveal the strategic intent because they didn't know it.
Which also means Israeli intelligence could have had — and we now know they did have — fragmentary indicators. Reports of unusual training activity. Satellite imagery of the mock kibbutz. And each fragment, looked at in isolation, looked like routine Hamas posturing.
That's the tragedy of it. The Israeli intelligence failure wasn't a failure to collect. It was a failure to synthesize. The signals were there, but they were disaggregated across different agencies, different analytical units, and nobody connected them into a coherent threat picture. There was a unit of IDF intelligence, Unit eight two zero zero, that had actually produced a detailed warning document — I want to say in twenty twenty-one or twenty twenty-two — that essentially described the October seventh plan. It was dismissed as aspirational, not operational.
Of course it was.
This gets to something deeper about how intelligence communities assess adversary intent. There's a persistent bias toward assuming the enemy is rational according to your own definition of rationality. The Israeli assessment was: Hamas is deterred. Hamas has too much to lose. A full-scale invasion would be suicidal. Therefore, they won't do it. What they missed was that Sinwar had a different calculus entirely — one where triggering a regional conflagration that would reshape the Middle East was worth the destruction of Gaza.
Let me pull on the compartmentalization thread a bit more. The prompt asks about ordinary Gazans. Would they have been surprised? And I think there's actually two separate questions here. One is: did they know the attack was coming? And the other is: did they know something big was being planned, even if they didn't know the specifics?
The evidence we have suggests a spectrum. At one end, you had the inner circle and their families. Sinwar's brother is a senior Hamas military commander — he certainly knew. The families of the top political and military leadership likely had some awareness that major operations were in advanced preparation, even if they didn't know the date or scale.
At the other end?
At the other end, you had ordinary Gazans who woke up on October seventh to the sound of thousands of rockets and fighters streaming across the border, and were shocked. But between those poles, there's a gray zone that's more interesting. We've seen evidence that Hamas had been running a sustained propaganda and ideological preparation campaign for years — framing a "great march of return" as inevitable, cultivating a culture of martyrdom and liberation through armed struggle. So while specific operational details were tightly held, the idea that a major armed confrontation was coming was not hidden. It was actively promoted.
That's the distinction between operational secrecy and ideological signaling. They kept the what and when secret, but the that was broadcast.
And this is actually a classic insurgent communication strategy. You tell your base: we are going to liberate Palestine through armed struggle, the day of reckoning is coming. That's public. It's mobilizing. It builds morale and recruits. But you never say: and it's happening on October seventh at six thirty in the morning, here are the grid coordinates. That part stays inside the five-person circle.
There's also the question of what Gazans saw in the weeks and months before. The training activity. The unusual movements. Did anyone notice and just not talk?
There were reports — and this came out in some of the post-attack journalism in Gaza, though reporting there is obviously constrained — of residents near the training sites noticing intensified activity. More fighters moving through. But in a place like Gaza, where Hamas is both the government and a militant organization, unusual military activity is also just the background noise of daily life. The question of whether someone "noticed" is different from whether they understood what it meant.
Like living next to a fire station and hearing sirens. After a while, you stop asking which direction they're headed.
And there's another factor here that I think is under-discussed: the role of Egyptian and Qatari mediation in creating a cover. In the months before October seventh, there was active diplomatic engagement about easing the blockade, increasing work permits for Gazans to enter Israel, improving economic conditions. Hamas was participating in these talks through intermediaries. Israeli intelligence read this as evidence that Hamas was prioritizing governance and economic stability over military confrontation. In hindsight, it was almost certainly a deliberate deception operation.
The diplomatic track as camouflage.
It worked brilliantly. Shin Bet and Mossad assessments from mid-twenty twenty-three explicitly stated that Hamas was seeking to avoid escalation. There was a National Security Council assessment — I saw this referenced in multiple post-mortems — that described Hamas as deterred and focused on economic development. The political echelon was getting intelligence summaries that reinforced their priors.
We've got the timeline — twenty fourteen concept, twenty sixteen to twenty seventeen formal planning, twenty nineteen detailed operational plan, twenty twenty-three execution. We've got the compartmentalization — concentric circles, nobody knew the full picture except a handful. What about the question of whether awareness was more widespread than we expected? Has anything emerged that challenges the narrative of total surprise?
There are a few data points that complicate the picture. One is the scale of the logistical preparation. We're talking about thousands of fighters, stockpiled weapons, pre-positioned fuel and ammunition, the breaching charges and technical equipment to disable the border surveillance systems. That's not something you can hide entirely. There were supply chain activities that, in retrospect, should have triggered alerts.
What kind of supply chain?
The paragliders, for one. Hamas acquired powered paragliders and trained extensively with them. That's not off-the-shelf Gazan market stuff. Those had to be imported, probably through the tunnel network from Egypt. The explosives used in the breaching charges were manufactured at scale. The communication equipment — they used a closed wired network inside Gaza's tunnel system specifically to avoid signals intelligence interception. All of that required procurement, manufacturing, movement of materials.
Someone in the supply chain knew. The guy sourcing paraglider motors might not know the invasion date, but he knows he's not buying them for recreational weekend flying.
This is where the concentric circles model gets stressed. The inner circle is five to seven people. But the logistics tail is necessarily wider. Maybe dozens of people involved in procurement, manufacturing, construction. Each of them knows their piece. And the question is whether any of them could have assembled enough pieces to see the outline of the whole.
Which is the classic intelligence puzzle. If you're a procurement officer sourcing breaching charges and you also happen to know about the paraglider training and the mock kibbutz construction, you might put it together. But the system is designed so that you don't know about the other pieces.
Hamas had a brutal enforcement mechanism for this. Betrayal meant death — not just for the individual, but potentially for their family. This isn't speculative. Hamas has a well-documented history of executing suspected collaborators, often publicly. The deterrent against anyone who suspected something and considered communicating it to Israeli intelligence was absolute.
You might suspect, but the cost of acting on that suspicion is so catastrophic that you convince yourself you didn't see what you saw.
Which is its own form of compartmentalization. Not structural, but psychological. People self-censor because the alternative is unthinkable.
Let me ask about the Egyptian angle. There were reports — and I remember these surfacing in the weeks after — that Egyptian intelligence had passed warnings to Israel. How does that fit into the timeline?
This is a contested part of the story, and I think it's important to be precise. What we know — and this has been reported by multiple credible outlets, including the Wall Street Journal and Haaretz — is that in the days before October seventh, Egyptian intelligence officials communicated to their Israeli counterparts that something unusual was happening in Gaza. The exact content of those warnings is disputed. Some accounts say they were specific about an impending large-scale attack. Others say they were more general — unusual activity, something seems to be brewing.
The Israeli response?
The Israeli government has acknowledged that some communications were received but has characterized them as vague and lacking actionable specifics. The Egyptian intelligence minister at the time — Abbas Kamel — reportedly called the head of Shin Bet directly. What exactly was said in that call remains classified. But the existence of pre-attack warnings from Egypt is not seriously disputed at this point.
Which adds another layer to the intelligence failure. It wasn't just that Israel missed signals in their own collection. Allies were actively trying to tell them, and the information didn't get where it needed to go.
Or it got there but wasn't believed. And this goes back to the cognitive bias problem. If your analytical framework says Hamas is deterred, and you receive a warning that contradicts that framework, the human tendency is to discount the warning, not the framework.
The framework has inertia.
And it's not unique to Israel. Every intelligence service in the world has failed this way at some point. The CIA before nine eleven. The US before Pearl Harbor. The Soviets before Barbarossa. The pattern is remarkably consistent: the signals are present, but the analytical paradigm can't accommodate them.
Let me pull us back to the prompt's specific question about how long the planning was. We've established the decade timeline. But I want to push on something. When we say Sinwar started planning in twenty fourteen, what does "planning" actually mean at that stage? Because there's a difference between "someday we should invade" and "here's the operational blueprint.
And the distinction matters. The twenty fourteen phase was what military planners would call conceptual development. Sinwar was thinking about the strategic problem: how do you defeat a technologically superior military that has complete air superiority, advanced surveillance, and a fortified border? His conclusion was that the conventional Hamas approach — rockets, tunnels, attrition — would never produce victory. You needed something that would shock the Israeli system so profoundly that it would trigger a cascade of regional responses.
The concept was: we don't need to win militarily. We need to win psychologically and politically.
The objective was never territorial conquest in the conventional sense. It was to shatter the Israeli sense of security, provoke an overwhelming military response that would kill large numbers of Palestinian civilians, and thereby isolate Israel diplomatically while drawing Hezbollah, Iran, and possibly others into a multi-front war. The military operation was the trigger for a political strategy.
Which is precisely what happened. The Israeli response in Gaza has been devastating, and the diplomatic cost has been enormous.
In that sense, the twenty fourteen conceptual phase was the most important part of the planning. Everything after that was operationalization: how do you actually breach the border fence? How do you disable the surveillance towers? How do you overwhelm the local IDF forces quickly enough to seize territory before reinforcements arrive? Those are engineering problems. The strategic insight — that a sufficiently horrific attack would achieve through Israeli response what Hamas couldn't achieve directly — that was the real plan.
There's something deeply unsettling about that. The atrocity was designed to provoke an even larger atrocity, and the civilian deaths on both sides were priced in from the beginning.
This is why the "rational actor" framework failed Israeli intelligence so completely. They assumed Sinwar wanted to preserve Hamas's military capability and govern Gaza. The evidence now suggests he was willing to sacrifice both — and the civilian population of Gaza — for a strategic objective he considered existential.
Let me bring in the Iran dimension, because I think it connects to the planning timeline. When did Iran become involved, and what role did they play?
Iran's involvement was gradual and deepening. The relationship between Hamas and Iran had been strained during the Syrian civil war, when Hamas sided with the Sunni opposition against Assad. But by twenty seventeen, that rift was healing. Qassem Soleimani — before his killing in twenty twenty — was instrumental in rebuilding the relationship. Iran began significantly increasing financial and technical support to Hamas's military wing.
The planning timeline aligns with the Iran re-engagement timeline.
And by twenty twenty, twenty twenty-one, Iranian support was substantial — hundreds of millions of dollars, technical assistance on rocket development, drone technology, and training. IRGC Quds Force operatives worked directly with Hamas military commanders. Some of the October seventh tactics — particularly the use of drones to disable surveillance — show clear Iranian influence and possibly direct Iranian training.
The drone tactics were one of the things that most surprised observers. Commercial quadcopters dropping munitions on surveillance towers. It was low-tech but devastatingly effective.
It's a tactic that was refined in other theaters. We saw similar approaches used by Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria. The innovation on October seventh wasn't the technology — it was the integration of cheap commercial drones with a multi-axis ground assault in a coordinated sequence.
Covering the drone with the ground.
The drones took out the remote surveillance capability, which blinded the IDF's situational awareness, which enabled the ground forces to approach the fence without being detected, which allowed the breaching teams to work without immediate interdiction. Each step was dependent on the previous step succeeding, and the whole sequence was rehearsed exhaustively.
Which brings us back to compartmentalization. If you're integrating drones, ground assault, paragliders, naval infiltration, and rocket barrages, you're coordinating across multiple units with different training requirements. How do you keep that hidden?
You don't integrate until the very end. Each element trains separately, for a contingency that may never happen. The drone operators train on disabling towers. The breaching teams train on blowing holes in fences. The paraglider unit trains on crossing the border by air. Nobody puts it all together until the final rehearsal — and even then, only the inner circle knows the full choreography.
It's like an orchestra where each section has been practicing their part for years, but nobody's heard the full symphony until opening night.
That's actually a perfect analogy. And the conductor — Sinwar and Deif — are the only ones with the full score.
The ordinary Gazan question. We've established that operational details were held extremely tight. But the prompt asks specifically: have we seen evidence that awareness the attack was eventual was more widely known than expected? I want to dig into the "eventual" part. Not the date, not the scale, but the inevitability.
There's evidence on both sides of this. Let me give you the argument for wider awareness. In the year before October seventh, Hamas had been running public messaging campaigns that were increasingly explicit about a coming confrontation. There were speeches, social media posts, even public murals in Gaza depicting fighters breaching the border fence. The "march of return" framing was everywhere. If you were a Gazan paying attention, the idea that Hamas was preparing for a major military operation wasn't a secret — it was propaganda.
Propaganda is cheap. Every resistance movement talks about liberation. The question is whether anyone understood it was imminent and specific.
That's where the evidence for wider awareness gets thin. We have not seen credible reporting suggesting that ordinary Gazans knew the date, the scale, or the specific targets. The shock in Gaza on October seventh appears to have been genuine. There was no mass evacuation of areas near the border, no pre-positioning of civilians to avoid the Israeli response. If there had been widespread awareness, you'd expect to see behavioral signals — people moving families, stockpiling supplies, pulling children from schools. We didn't see that.
Which suggests the concentric circles held.
The question is whether they held perfectly or just well enough. And I think "well enough" is the answer. A few dozen people in the logistics chain may have suspected. A few family members of senior commanders may have known something was imminent. But the broader population of Gaza was not in on the secret. They were as surprised as anyone when thousands of fighters poured across the border.
There's a darker reading of that, though. Even if they didn't know the specifics, there was a significant portion of the population that celebrated what happened when it happened. The videos of civilians following the fighters through the breached fence, the celebrations in the streets — that's not the reaction of a population that found the attack abhorrent.
That's a fair point, and it complicates the narrative of complete civilian innocence. The rejoicing was real and it was documented. But I'd caution against extrapolating from the visible celebrants to the entire population. In an authoritarian environment, there's also a coercive dynamic — not celebrating can be dangerous. And the people who streamed through the fence were a self-selected group. The majority of Gazans stayed home.
Let's talk about the Israeli investigations. What's the official Israeli assessment now of the planning timeline? Has there been a consolidated government report?
The IDF and Shin Bet have both conducted extensive internal investigations. The IDF's official after-action review was released in stages through twenty twenty-five and early twenty twenty-six. It confirmed the multi-year planning timeline and acknowledged catastrophic intelligence failure. The Shin Bet report was more politically contentious because it pointed to policy decisions — including the focus on West Bank security at the expense of Gaza monitoring — as contributing factors.
The West Bank distraction is an important part of this story. In the months before October seventh, there was significant Israeli security focus on West Bank instability, settler violence, and Palestinian Authority governance issues. Resources were shifted.
Hamas deliberately encouraged that. They were stoking West Bank tensions as a diversion. There was a specific Hamas unit running operations in the West Bank — not large attacks, but enough to keep Israeli security forces focused there. Meanwhile, the real preparations in Gaza continued uninterrupted.
The old magician's trick. Look at this hand while the other hand does the work.
The IDF's Gaza Division was under-strength on October seventh. It was a holiday — Simchat Torah — and many soldiers were on leave. The forces that were present were positioned based on a threat assessment that had not been updated to reflect the actual risk. The whole defensive posture was calibrated for a different scenario.
To summarize the timeline for the listener: we're looking at roughly a decade from conceptual seed to execution. Twenty fourteen: Sinwar begins developing the strategic concept. Twenty sixteen to twenty seventeen: formal planning begins with a small inner circle. Twenty nineteen: detailed operational plan exists, training begins on mock facilities. Twenty twenty to twenty twenty-two: capability building, Iranian support deepens, diplomatic deception operations continue. Twenty twenty-three: execution. And then the world changed.
That's the arc. And I'd add one more piece that often gets overlooked: the decision to actually execute in twenty twenty-three wasn't made until relatively late. Even with all the preparation, there was a final go no-go decision, and it appears to have been tied to specific geopolitical conditions — the progressing Saudi-Israeli normalization talks, internal Israeli political turmoil over judicial reform, and a perceived window of Israeli vulnerability.
The normalization piece is crucial. The Abraham Accords were expanding. Saudi Arabia was moving toward recognition of Israel. That would have fundamentally reshaped the regional landscape in a way that was catastrophic for Hamas's long-term relevance. October seventh can be read as an attempt to blow up normalization before it could be consummated.
In that, it succeeded. The Saudi normalization track was frozen within days. The regional conversation shifted entirely. Whatever long-term strategic damage Hamas suffered, the short-term political objective was achieved.
The planning wasn't just long in duration. It was opportunistic in timing. The fuse was laid over a decade, but the match was struck at a specific moment of perceived maximum leverage.
Which is classic strategic thinking, and it's why the "they're irrational" framing failed so badly. Sinwar was extremely rational by his own lights. He had a theory of victory, he built the capability over years, he waited for the optimal moment, and he executed. The fact that his theory of victory involved the destruction of Gaza and the deaths of tens of thousands of his own people doesn't make it irrational. It makes it monstrous, but monstrous and irrational are different things.
That's a distinction a lot of coverage misses. Calling it irrational is comforting because it suggests no one could have predicted it. Calling it rationally monstrous means someone should have.
That's the uncomfortable conclusion of every serious investigation. This was predictable. The specific timing wasn't knowable, but the intent, the capability, and the broad outlines of the plan were all visible. They just weren't seen.
Let me ask one more question about the compartmentalization, and then I want to get to the broader implications. How does an organization maintain this level of secrecy for seven years when Israeli intelligence has one of the most aggressive human intelligence operations in the world? We're not just talking about signals security. We're talking about not having a single person in the logistics chain, the training apparatus, or the political leadership get flipped or make a mistake.
Part of the answer is the brutality I mentioned earlier. Hamas's counterintelligence apparatus is ruthless and effective. They've spent decades learning how Israel recruits assets and they've developed sophisticated countermeasures — vetting, compartmentalization, deception operations, and the credible threat of lethal consequences.
That can't be the whole answer. Brutal regimes get penetrated all the time.
The other part is that Israeli human intelligence in Gaza had atrophied. After the twenty fourteen war, Israel relied increasingly on technical intelligence — signals intercepts, satellite imagery, cyber operations. Human sources inside Hamas's military wing became scarcer. Partly this was because Hamas got better at counterintelligence. Partly it was because Israel shifted resources. And partly it was because the operational environment in Gaza made running agents extremely difficult.
The failure was multi-layered. Analytical failures, resource allocation failures, and a gradual degradation of human intelligence capability.
A political failure. The Netanyahu government's policy toward Hamas for years was essentially: contain, manage, deter. The concept was that Hamas could be kept at a manageable level of threat while Israel focused on other priorities — Iran's nuclear program, normalization with Arab states, West Bank security. The idea that Hamas could be deterred indefinitely was a policy choice, not an intelligence assessment, and it shaped what intelligence was collected and how it was analyzed.
The policy drove the intelligence rather than the intelligence driving the policy.
That's the critique that's been leveled by multiple former intelligence officials. And it's not unique to Israel — it's a universal problem in intelligence-policy relations. But the consequences here were catastrophic.
Where does this leave us? The prompt asks what we've learned. We've learned the planning was a decade long. We've learned the compartmentalization was radically effective, built on concentric circles and brutal enforcement. We've learned that ordinary Gazans were largely surprised by the specifics but had been ideologically prepared for something.
I think the biggest lesson is about the limits of deterrence against non-state actors who don't value the same things you value. The Israeli deterrence model assumed Hamas valued governing Gaza, building infrastructure, maintaining political control. Sinwar demonstrated that he valued something else more — a strategic transformation of the regional order — and was willing to sacrifice everything for it. Deterrence only works if you correctly understand what the adversary wants to preserve.
Which is a lesson that extends far beyond Israel and Hamas. Every country that faces non-state adversaries is grappling with this same problem.
The second lesson is about the danger of analytical overconfidence. The Israeli intelligence community was widely regarded as one of the best in the world. They had every technical advantage. And they still failed catastrophically because their analytical framework was wrong. No amount of collection can compensate for a flawed paradigm.
The most sophisticated surveillance apparatus in the world, and it was defeated by seven years of patience and a handful of people who kept a secret.
That's the uncomfortable summary. And now: Hilbert's daily fun fact.
Hilbert: In eighteen eighty-four, an astronomer in the Azores named José António de Almeida reported seeing a "luminous transient" on the lunar surface near the crater Plato, which he claimed was volcanic activity. The observation was widely cited for decades as evidence of active lunar volcanism. It was later determined he had almost certainly observed a bright meteor entering Earth's atmosphere along his line of sight to the moon — an optical coincidence, not a lunar event at all.
He aimed his telescope at the moon, saw a meteor flash in front of it, and claimed the moon was erupting.
It took decades to correct. That's somehow the most astronomy thing I've ever heard.
So here's the forward-looking question I keep coming back to. We've now seen what a decade of planning can produce when a non-state actor is patient, disciplined, and willing to absorb catastrophic retaliation. What else is being planned right now, in some inner circle somewhere, that will seem obvious in retrospect ten years from now?
That's the question that keeps intelligence analysts up at night. And the honest answer is: we don't know. The same cognitive biases that failed before are still operating. The same resource constraints shape what gets monitored. The same political pressures influence what gets reported up the chain. The structure of the problem hasn't changed, even if the specific threat has.
Which is why the lesson of October seventh isn't really about Hamas or Gaza or even Israel. It's about the universal vulnerability of even the most sophisticated defense establishments to a sufficiently patient, sufficiently disciplined adversary who thinks differently than you expect them to think.
That's a lesson every country needs to learn, and relearn, and probably learn again the hard way.
This has been My Weird Prompts. Thanks to our producer Hilbert Flumingtop. You can find us at myweirdprompts dot com, and if you enjoyed this episode, leave us a review wherever you're listening. We'll be back next week.
