Hey everyone, welcome back to My Weird Prompts. We are coming to you from Jerusalem, and today we are diving into a topic that feels particularly close to home, given where we are sitting right now. It is February twenty-first, two thousand twenty-six, and the atmosphere here in the city is, to put it mildly, incredibly tense. Daniel’s prompt for this episode is about a recent report from the Times of Israel, which suggests that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—or the I-R-G-C—is moving beyond just being a benefactor for Hezbollah. They are reportedly taking a direct, hands-on role in running the organization and preparing it for a potential large-scale war with Israel and the United States.
Herman Poppleberry here. And yeah, Corn, this report is fascinating because it describes a shift from what we usually call proxy warfare to something much more integrated. The report, which actually cites sources from the Saudi outlet Al Arabiya, suggests that I-R-G-C officers are physically present in Lebanon, essentially coaching and leading Hezbollah units. It is not just about sending crates of missiles anymore; it is about sending the people who know exactly how to use them and, more importantly, the people who are calling the shots on when and where to use them. We are talking about a level of operational fusion that we haven't seen at this scale since the height of the Cold War.
It is a massive escalation in terms of organizational structure. We have often talked about Hezbollah as the crown jewel of Iran’s regional strategy, but this makes it sound less like an independent partner and more like a regional branch office with H-Q managers on the floor. Daniel’s prompt specifically asks about the mechanics of this. How does this work in practice? And why is this type of in-person, hands-on involvement so much more valuable for a network like this than, say, remote support or digital coordination?
That is the core of it. Because on the surface, you might think, wait, it is two thousand twenty-six. We have encrypted messaging, we have high-definition video conferencing, we have virtual reality training modules. Why risk sending high-value I-R-G-C officers into a zone where they are targets for air strikes or intelligence operations? But the reality of high-stakes military and insurgent coordination is that there is no substitute for physical presence. To understand why, you have to look at the limitations of technology in a contested environment.
Well, before we get into the why, let’s look at the how. When we say the I-R-G-C is running Hezbollah, what does that actually look like on the ground? Are we talking about an Iranian general sitting in a bunker in Beirut telling a Hezbollah commander which button to press, or is it deeper than that?
It is much deeper. It is what we call institutional embedding. Think of it like a corporate merger where the parent company doesn't just send a new C-E-O, but they send a whole layer of middle management and technical experts to sit in every department. In the military context, this means I-R-G-C Quds Force officers are likely embedded at the strategic planning level, the intelligence level, and even the tactical level within specific specialized units—like their drone teams or their precision-guided missile divisions. We are seeing reports of Iranian officers actually wearing Hezbollah uniforms in some sectors to blend in, while in others, they are clearly the ones presiding over the sand tables and the digital maps.
So it’s a transfer of command-and-control. But Daniel’s prompt also mentions a transfer of knowledge and leadership through coaching. That implies a pedagogical element. They aren't just doing the job; they are teaching the Hezbollah operatives how to do the job the Iranian way.
Exactly. And the Iranian way has evolved significantly over the last decade. If you look at the I-R-G-C’s involvement in Syria, for example, they learned a lot about modern, multi-domain warfare. They saw how to integrate traditional infantry with heavy artillery, drones, and electronic warfare. Hezbollah has always been a formidable guerrilla force, but Iran is trying to transition them into a hybrid army. That kind of transition requires a level of nuance that you just cannot get from a manual or a series of videos. It requires a mentor-protégé relationship where the mentor can see the mistakes in real-time.
I want to push on that. Why is it that this knowledge cannot be transferred digitally? We live in an era where you can learn to build a jet engine on YouTube. What is it about the I-R-G-C’s coaching that requires them to be there in the flesh?
There are several layers to that, but the first and most practical one is security. If you are a high-ranking I-R-G-C officer and you are communicating with Hezbollah leadership via any kind of digital network, you are creating a signature. Even with the best encryption in the world, the metadata alone is a death sentence. The Israeli and American signals intelligence capabilities—what we call S-I-G-I-N-T—are so advanced that any digital footprint can be used to geolocate you or identify your network of contacts. We saw what happened in late two thousand twenty-four with the pager and walkie-talkie incidents. That was a massive wake-up call for these groups. They realized that any piece of consumer or even specialized electronics can be turned into a tracking device or a weapon.
Right, so the safest way to talk is to not use a signal at all. You sit in a room, you look at a map, and you talk. No electronic emissions, no digital trail.
Precisely. In the world of intelligence, we often talk about the air gap. The ultimate air gap is a face-to-face conversation in a secure, shielded room. But beyond the security aspect, there is the concept of tacit knowledge. This is a huge concept in organizational psychology and military science. Explicit knowledge is stuff you can write down—like the specifications of a drone. Tacit knowledge is the stuff you can only learn through experience and observation. It is the feel of the terrain, the split-second decision-making when a plan goes wrong, the ability to read the morale of your troops.
It’s the difference between reading a recipe and standing next to a master chef while they show you exactly how to fold the dough. You see the pressure they use, you smell the ingredients, you see the timing.
That is a perfect analogy. And in a military context, that tacit knowledge is about the friction of war. The I-R-G-C officers have seen how their systems perform against Western-style defenses in places like Yemen or Iraq. They can stand there with a Hezbollah commander and say, look, when the sirens go off and the electronic jamming starts, this is how the hardware is going to react, and this is how you need to adjust your tactics. You can't put that in a P-D-F. You need to be there to demonstrate the muscle memory.
And there is the leadership aspect too, right? Daniel mentioned leadership transfer. That suggests a cultural alignment. If the I-R-G-C is preparing Hezbollah for a war with Israel and the U-S, they want to ensure that Hezbollah’s goals and Iranian strategic interests are perfectly aligned. Having your own people in the room ensures there is no drift in the mission.
That is a huge point. It is about building a shared mental model. When things get chaotic in a high-intensity conflict, you need your subordinates to act instinctively in a way that aligns with your overall strategy. By having I-R-G-C officers coaching these units, they are essentially deeply socializing them into the I-R-G-C’s operational philosophy. It creates a level of trust and mutual understanding that you simply cannot build over a screen. It also bridges the linguistic and cultural gap. While many Hezbollah members speak some Farsi and many I-R-G-C officers speak Arabic, the nuances of military jargon and strategic intent can get lost in translation if you aren't looking someone in the eye.
I also wonder about the psychological impact on the ground. If you are a Hezbollah fighter and you see high-ranking Iranian officers standing there with you, it sends a powerful message of commitment. It says Tehran isn't just using you as cannon fodder; they are in the trenches with you. But it also works the other way—it acts as a form of oversight. It makes it very hard for Hezbollah to back down or take a different path if the I-R-G-C is literally standing over their shoulder.
It is a double-edged sword for sure. It provides a massive boost in capability and confidence, but it also means Hezbollah loses a significant amount of its autonomy. They are becoming an extension of the Iranian military apparatus. And the report notes that this is happening as the Lebanese state is trying to distance itself from Hezbollah. It creates this bizarre situation where you have a foreign military entity—the I-R-G-C—running a local militia that is more powerful than the national army, all while ignoring the official government. It’s what scholars call a state-within-a-state, but now the inner state is being managed by a foreign power.
It’s the ultimate shadow state. Now, let’s talk about the specific types of training or coaching that might be happening. The report mentions preparing for war with Israel and the U-S. That implies some very specific, high-end capabilities. We aren't talking about basic infantry drills. What are the specific domains where this in-person coaching is most critical?
I would point to three main areas. First is what we call C-four-I—Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence. Coordinating a massive rocket barrage while simultaneously managing drone swarms and anti-tank teams requires a very sophisticated command structure. The I-R-G-C is likely bringing in their experts to set up these integrated command centers. They are teaching Hezbollah how to use Iranian satellite data, how to process real-time intelligence from drones, and how to relay that to units in the field without being intercepted.
And that is something that is incredibly hard to do remotely because it involves physical infrastructure and local networking. You have to physically wire these bunkers and ensure the hardware is hardened against electronic attack.
Exactly. Second is the precision-guided missile or P-G-M program. It is one thing to point a Katyusha rocket in the general direction of a city and fire. It is another thing entirely to operate a high-tech missile that can hit a specific window in a building miles away. These systems require complex calibration, maintenance, and targeting data. The I-R-G-C has the technical expertise that Hezbollah needs to turn their massive stockpile of dumb rockets into a fleet of smart missiles. This often involves installing conversion kits, and that is a hands-on mechanical process. You need an Iranian engineer standing there showing the Hezbollah technician how to align the G-P-S sensors and the fins.
And the third?
Electronic and cyber warfare. We know Iran has invested heavily in the ability to jam communications and hack into military networks. If they are preparing for a war with Israel, they know they will be facing some of the most advanced electronic defenses in the world. Coaching Hezbollah on how to operate in a contested electromagnetic environment is something that requires hands-on, real-time feedback. You need to be there with the equipment to show them how to bypass a specific type of jammer or how to secure their own communications. It’s a game of cat and mouse that happens in milliseconds.
It’s interesting you mention the electronic environment because that brings us back to why digital support is so dangerous. If the I-R-G-C were trying to teach these things via a secure digital link, the very act of teaching would likely reveal the vulnerabilities they are trying to exploit or the specific frequencies they are planning to use. By doing it in person, they keep their cards very close to their chest.
That is a brilliant point, Corn. In intelligence, we call it the observer effect. The act of communicating a secret can often reveal the secret itself, even if the content is encrypted. But if I am standing in a bunker in the Bekaa Valley and I point to a specific piece of hardware and say, flip this switch when the Israeli radar does this, that information never enters the digital ether. It stays in that room. It’s the ultimate form of operational security.
Let's talk about the logistics of this presence. How are these officers getting there? We know Israel monitors the Beirut airport and the border crossings very closely.
It’s the Iranian land bridge. It’s a route that runs from Tehran through Iraq, into Syria, and finally into Lebanon. The I-R-G-C has spent years establishing a network of safe houses, warehouses, and secondary roads. They use civilian vehicles, humanitarian convoys, and even local commercial trucks to move personnel and equipment. It’s a slow process, but it’s much harder to track than a flight. And once they are in Lebanon, they disappear into the social fabric of the areas Hezbollah controls. They live in ordinary apartments, they shop in local markets. They become ghosts in the machine.
It makes me think about the risks, though. The I-R-G-C has lost several high-ranking officers to air strikes in Syria and Lebanon over the last year or two. We saw the strike in Damascus back in April of two thousand twenty-four that killed several top Quds Force commanders, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi. If they are increasing their physical presence, they are essentially putting more of their best and brightest in the crosshairs. Why is the value of the coaching worth that risk?
Because the alternative is losing their most important strategic asset. Iran has spent decades and billions of dollars building Hezbollah into a deterrent against an attack on Iran itself. If Hezbollah isn't ready for a high-intensity war, or if they fumble their opening moves because they weren't properly coordinated, then Iran’s entire regional strategy collapses. To the I-R-G-C leadership, a few dead generals are a small price to pay to ensure that Hezbollah remains a sharp, functional sword at Israel’s throat. It’s a cold, utilitarian calculation. They view their officers as martyrs-in-waiting anyway.
It’s a cold calculation indeed. And it also suggests they believe the war is coming sooner rather than later. You don't send in the heavy-duty coaches unless you think the game is about to start. This isn't just about long-term capacity building; it’s about immediate readiness.
That is the most sobering part of the report. This isn't just routine maintenance. The language used is preparing for war. It suggests an urgency. They are trying to compress what would normally be years of training and integration into a much shorter timeframe. It is like a crash course in advanced warfare. They are running drills, they are stockpiling supplies in specific forward-operating bases, and they are streamlining the chain of command so that when the order comes, there is no hesitation.
Let’s talk about the historical context for a second. Daniel mentioned the example of Irish paramilitaries training with the P-L-O. We have seen these kinds of cross-group training programs for decades. But this feels different. The P-L-O and the I-R-A were two different organizations with some shared goals, trading tips. This I-R-G-C and Hezbollah dynamic feels more like a total vertical integration.
You hit the nail on the head. In the past, these alliances were often horizontal—two independent groups helping each other out. What we are seeing now with the Axis of Resistance is a hub-and-spoke model where the hub—Tehran—is exerting more and more direct control over the spokes. It is less like an alliance and more like a single, distributed military organization. Think of it like the relationship between the U-S military and some of its most closely integrated allies, but without the formal treaties and with a much more aggressive ideological component.
Which changes how we have to think about accountability. If an I-R-G-C officer is the one who coached the unit, provided the targeting data, and potentially even gave the order for a strike, is that an act of war by Iran, even if the missile was fired by a guy in a Hezbollah uniform?
That is the trillion-dollar question. For a long time, the whole point of the proxy model was plausible deniability. Iran could say, hey, we just give them the tools, what they do with them is their business. But as that involvement becomes more hands-on, the line between the proxy and the patron becomes so thin that it practically disappears. If the I-R-G-C is running the show, the plausible deniability is gone. It becomes a direct Iranian operation by another name. This is why you see Israeli officials increasingly saying they will hold Tehran directly responsible for any major escalation from Lebanon.
And yet, they keep doing it. It speaks to a shift in their risk tolerance. Maybe they feel that the deniability isn't working anymore anyway, so they might as well get the full tactical benefit of being there in person.
I think that’s exactly it. In the age of satellite surveillance and advanced intelligence, everyone knows who is behind these groups. The pretense of deniability has become a polite fiction that neither side really believes anymore. So, if the secret is out, you might as well maximize your effectiveness. If you are going to be blamed for the strike anyway, you might as well make sure the strike hits its target.
So, if we look at this from the perspective of the U-S and Israel, how do you counter this? If the value is in the physical presence and the in-person coaching, then the counter-strategy is obviously to disrupt that presence. But that leads to a cycle of escalation. Every time you take out an Iranian coach, you are striking Iran directly, even if it is on Lebanese soil.
It’s a very dangerous game of cat and mouse. The response from the West and Israel has been a mix of targeted kinetic strikes—actually hitting the people and the facilities—and trying to disrupt the logistics. But the I-R-G-C is very good at moving people. They use civilian flights, they use land routes through Iraq and Syria. They are experts at blending in. Another counter-strategy is psychological operations—trying to drive a wedge between the local Hezbollah fighters and their Iranian overseers. You highlight the fact that the Iranians are calling the shots and using Lebanese lives to protect Iranian interests.
It also makes the intelligence gathering much harder for the West. If the coaching is happening in person, you can't just hack a server to find out what the new battle plan is. You need human intelligence. You need someone in that room, or at least someone in the building. And that is a much higher bar to clear.
Absolutely. We have seen a massive shift back toward H-U-M-I-N-T—human intelligence—for exactly this reason. As these groups move their most sensitive discussions and training offline, the only way to stay ahead of them is to have eyes and ears on the ground. But as you can imagine, infiltrating a group like Hezbollah, especially when they are being closely monitored by the I-R-G-C, is incredibly difficult. They have their own counter-intelligence units—like Unit nine hundred—that are trained by the Iranians to look for exactly that. It’s a high-stakes game of spy versus spy.
It’s a fascinating, if terrifying, escalation of the conflict. It’s moving from the digital and financial realm back into the deeply personal and physical realm. It’s a reminder that even in two thousand twenty-six, war is still fundamentally about people standing in rooms and making decisions. We talk so much about A-I and autonomous weapons, but at the end of the day, the brain behind the machine is what matters most.
Exactly. And the most effective way to transfer the most dangerous knowledge is still through a mentor-apprentice relationship. It’s the most ancient form of teaching being used to operate the most modern forms of weaponry. It’s a paradox of the modern age. We have all this technology, yet we are returning to the most basic human interactions to ensure its effectiveness.
I want to go back to the idea of the "hybrid army." When the I-R-G-C coaches Hezbollah, are they trying to make them look like a regular army, or are they trying to keep them as a guerrilla force but with better toys?
It's both. They want the flexibility of a guerrilla force—the ability to disappear into the civilian population, the decentralized command—but with the punch of a conventional army. This is what we call "mosaic defense." It’s about having thousands of small, independent cells that can all act in concert because they’ve been trained in the same shared mental model. The I-R-G-C coaching is the glue that holds that mosaic together. They are teaching them how to use "swarming" tactics where multiple small units attack a single target from different directions simultaneously, using different types of weapons.
That sounds incredibly difficult to coordinate without a very high level of training.
It is. It requires a level of tactical discipline that most militia groups just don't have. That’s why the I-R-G-C presence is so critical. They aren't just teaching them how to shoot; they are teaching them how to think like a professional military officer. They are teaching them about logistics, about medical evacuation, about how to rotate troops during a long battle. These are the "boring" parts of war that actually win conflicts.
So, if we were to summarize the practical takeaways for our listeners, what should they be looking for in the news? How do we know if this coaching is having an effect?
Watch the complexity of the operations. If we start seeing Hezbollah using more coordinated, multi-domain attacks—drones working in perfect sync with precision missiles and electronic jamming—that is a hallmark of I-R-G-C coaching. Also, look at the rhetoric. If the coordination between the different groups in the Axis of Resistance—the Houthis in Yemen, the militias in Iraq, and Hezbollah—becomes more seamless, that is a sign of a central command-and-control structure that is being managed by those I-R-G-C officers on the ground. You might see a strike in the Red Sea and a rocket barrage from Lebanon happen within minutes of each other, clearly coordinated by a single hand.
It’s also worth watching the Lebanese political scene. As the I-R-G-C takes more control over Hezbollah, the tension between Hezbollah and the rest of Lebanon will likely increase. A Lebanon that is being used as a training ground for an Iranian-led war is a Lebanon that is at extreme risk. We are already seeing voices in Beirut—even within the Shia community—asking why their country is being turned into a forward operating base for a foreign power.
And finally, keep an eye on the strikes. If we see an increase in targeted strikes against high-level Iranian officials in Lebanon and Syria, it’s a clear indication that the intelligence services are trying to decapitate that coaching network. They know that the person is the most valuable part of the system. Every time an experienced I-R-G-C coach is taken off the board, it sets the training program back by months.
It really brings home the idea that in this high-tech age, the human element is still the most critical vulnerability and the most critical asset. Daniel’s prompt really hit on a key shift in how these conflicts are being managed. It’s not just about the weapons; it’s about the hands that hold them and the minds that guide them. It’s about the "human software" that runs the "military hardware."
Well said, Corn. It’s a grim reality, but understanding the mechanics of it is the first step in understanding the broader regional dynamics. This isn't just a local skirmish; it’s a deeply integrated, transnational military project. It’s a challenge to the entire international order, and it’s happening right in our backyard.
And that is probably a good place to wrap up this part of the discussion. It’s a heavy topic, especially living here in Jerusalem where the implications of these reports are felt in real-time. You can feel the weight of it when you walk down the street and see the increased security presence. But that’s why we do this show—to dig into these weird and often unsettling prompts and try to make sense of the world, even when the world feels like it's on the brink.
Exactly. And we really appreciate Daniel for sending this one in. It’s timely, it’s complex, and it’s something that a lot of the mainstream coverage misses by focusing only on the missiles and not the people running them. We need to look past the hardware to see the strategy.
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Alright, that’s it for today’s episode. Thanks for joining us for another deep dive on My Weird Prompts. I’m Corn.
And I’m Herman Poppleberry.
We’ll talk to you next time. Goodbye!
Bye!
