Hey everyone, welcome back to My Weird Prompts. I am Corn Poppleberry, coming to you from our home in Jerusalem. We are doing something a little bit different today. Usually, our housemate Daniel sends us an audio prompt to kick things off, but this week, we decided to pick the topic ourselves. There is just too much happening right now in the region to ignore the massive question mark sitting right on Irans doorstep.
Herman Poppleberry here. And you are absolutely right, Corn. We are currently in March of two thousand twenty-six, and the war between Israel and the Iranian regime has reached a fever pitch. But while everyone is looking at missile trajectories, drone swarms, and naval blockades in the Persian Gulf, there is this quiet, simmering tension in the mountains of the north and west. We are talking about the Kurds. They are the largest stateless nation in the world, with roughly forty million people spread across four different countries, and they have a history of being the ultimate wild card in Middle Eastern conflicts.
It is a fascinating paradox, Herman. You have forty million people with a shared language, culture, and history, yet zero sovereign borders to call their own. And right now, as the regional order seems to be fracturing, they have a front-row seat to what could be the collapse of the Islamic Republic. But just in the last few days, we have seen these very formal, very stern denials coming out of Erbil in Iraq and the Qandil Mountains. Kurdish officials are basically saying, we are not involved, we have no plans to get involved, and we are staying neutral in this fight between Israel and the Islamic Republic.
Strategic ambiguity is the name of the game. For the Kurds, a weakened Iran is both an existential opportunity and an existential threat. They have spent a century waiting for the right moment to secure their own sovereignty, and every time the regional order collapses, they make a move. But they also know that if they move too early, or if they pick the wrong side, the retaliation can be genocidal. The question we are asking today is whether two thousand twenty-six is finally that moment, or if they are about to be caught in the gears of a much larger machine once again.
To really understand this, I think we have to start with the geography and the sheer scale of who we are talking about. Most people hear the word Kurds and they think of Northern Iraq, maybe Northern Syria because of the fight against the Islamic State a few years back. But the Kurdish reality is much bigger and much more complex. Herman, give us the bird's eye view of this Kurdish belt.
So, imagine a mountain range that arcs through the heart of the Middle East like a crescent. This is the Kurdish heartland. You have about fifteen to twenty million Kurds in Turkey, primarily in the southeast. You have maybe eight to ten million in Iran, concentrated in the west and northwest. There are six million in Iraq, and another two or three million in Syria. They are divided by borders that were drawn by the British and the French after World War One, specifically the Treaty of Lausanne in nineteen twenty-three, which essentially ignored the promise of a Kurdish state made in the earlier Treaty of Sevres.
And that historical grievance is the engine that drives everything we are seeing today. In the context of the current war in March of two thousand twenty-six, the Iranian Kurds are the ones we need to watch most closely. They live primarily in the Zagros Mountains, which form the natural, rugged border between Iran and Iraq. If you want to destabilize the Iranian regime from within, those mountains are the perfect place to start. They are a natural fortress.
They really are. And that brings us to the groups that have actually been fighting Tehran for decades. We are talking about groups like the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, or the KDPI, and the Free Life Party of Kurdistan, known as PJAK. These are not just political clubs; they are hardened, armed insurgencies with thousands of fighters who have been living in exile in the Iraqi mountains, just waiting for the central authority in Tehran to crack. PJAK is particularly interesting because they are closely linked to the PKK in Turkey, which gives them a very radical, grassroots organizational structure.
And we saw that crack start to widen back in September of two thousand twenty-two with the Mahsa Amini protests. It is important to remember that Mahsa Amini was Kurdish. Her Kurdish name was Jina. The whole Woman, Life, Freedom movement actually started in the Kurdish regions of Iran, in cities like Saqqez and Sanandaj, before spreading to Tehran and Isfahan. The regime responded with brutal force, but they never truly extinguished that fire. Now, with the Israeli Air Force systematically dismantling the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps infrastructure, as we discussed back in episode nine hundred thirty-one, the internal security apparatus of Iran is stretched thinner than it has ever been.
That is the core of the opportunity. In episode nine hundred thirty-one, we talked about the "Octopus" and how Israel is targeting the head of the regime while its tentacles are flailing. If the IRGC is busy trying to defend its nuclear sites in Natanz or its missile silos from Israeli strikes, they cannot commit the same level of resources to policing the Kurdish provinces. It creates a security vacuum. But here is the catch, and this is where the geopolitical chess gets really messy. The Kurds have been burned so many times by foreign powers that they are incredibly wary of being seen as an Israeli proxy.
That is the foundational trauma of the Kurdish people. They have a saying: no friends but the mountains. And honestly, looking at the history, it is hard to blame them. But let's talk about that Israel connection, because it is one of the most fascinating covert alliances in modern history. It goes back to what David Ben-Gurion called the Periphery Doctrine in the nineteen fifties and sixties.
Right, the Periphery Doctrine was a brilliant, if cold-blooded, strategy. The idea was that since the Arab world was hostile to Israel, Israel should seek alliances with the non-Arab actors on the edges of the Middle East. That meant Turkey, pre-revolutionary Iran under the Shah, and the Kurds. In the nineteen sixties, the Mossad was actively training Kurdish rebels in Northern Iraq. There were Israeli officers in the mountains with Mustafa Barzani, the legendary Kurdish leader. Israel saw the Kurds as a way to keep the Iraqi army busy so they couldn't join the fight against Israel on the western front.
It was a purely transactional, realpolitik arrangement. But over the decades, it turned into something deeper. There is a genuine cultural affinity there. Both are small, non-Arab nations fighting for survival in a very tough neighborhood. We talked about some of these shadow operations in episode seven hundred thirty-eight, but the modern version of this is much more high-tech. We are talking about intelligence sharing, satellite data, and potentially even covert logistics.
But even with that history, the Kurds are looking at the current map and seeing a lot of landmines. If they move too early, they get crushed by the IRGC. If they move in a way that looks too much like an Israeli operation, they lose support from the rest of the Iranian opposition who might still be nationalist and wary of foreign intervention. And then there is the Turkish factor, which is perhaps the biggest landmine of all.
We definitely need to dive into Turkey, but first, let's look at the model they are following. Herman, you mentioned the nineteen ninety-one Gulf War earlier. That seems like the blueprint for what might happen in two thousand twenty-six.
It really is. After the first Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein was weakened by the international coalition, the Kurds in Iraq rose up. They were initially crushed, which led to a massive humanitarian crisis, but that crisis forced the West to create a no-fly zone. That no-fly zone eventually allowed for the creation of the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, or the KRG. That is the dream for Iranian Kurds right now—a moment of regime weakness that leads to international protection and eventual autonomy.
But the KRG in Iraq is in a very different position today than it was in nineteen ninety-one. They are in the most difficult position of all in this current Iran-Israel war. On one hand, they have deep economic ties to Iran. They share a massive border, they trade energy, and the IRGC has shown that it is more than willing to lob ballistic missiles at Erbil if they think the Kurds are getting too close to Israel. Remember the strikes on Erbil in early twenty-four? They claimed they were hitting a Mossad base, but it was a clear message to the Kurdish leadership: we can reach you.
On the other hand, the KRG is where the Iranian Kurdish rebel groups like the KDPI are based. Erbil has to play this impossible game of telling Tehran, we aren't helping the rebels, while simultaneously telling the rebels, we won't kick you out, and telling the Israelis, we are still your friends. It is like walking between raindrops, as we talked about in episode five hundred fifty-five. But the KRG is also still reeling from the failure of their independence referendum in two thousand seventeen. That is a really important piece of context for why they are being so cautious right now.
Oh, that was a massive blow. I remember the footage of people dancing in the streets. Ninety-two point seven percent of people voted for independence. It was a landslide. The people were ready. But the international community, including the United States, basically turned their backs. Baghdad sent the tanks in, supported by Iranian-backed militias, and they took back the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. The Kurds lost almost half the territory they had been controlling. It was a stark reminder that even when you win at the ballot box, if you don't have the military power or the international backing to hold the ground, you lose everything.
And that is why these denials we are seeing in March of two thousand twenty-six are so loud. They are trying to avoid a repeat of two thousand seventeen. They don't want to give the Iranian regime an excuse to invade Northern Iraq under the guise of security. But at the same time, we know from reporting that the communication channels between the Kurds and the West are wide open. This is where we have to look at the second-order effects. If the Iranian regime actually starts to collapse, the Kurds in Iran aren't just going to sit there. They are going to seize government buildings, they are going to take over military outposts, and they are going to try to carve out an autonomous zone similar to what their cousins have in Iraq.
If that happens, you suddenly have a contiguous Kurdish-controlled corridor from the Mediterranean in Syria all the way to the heart of the Zagros Mountains in Iran. And that is exactly what keeps the leaders in Ankara awake at night. Herman, let's talk about Turkey. You cannot discuss the Kurds without discussing the Turkish government's obsession with preventing a Kurdish state.
Turkey is the massive variable in this equation. They have been fighting the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers Party, for over forty years. It has cost tens of thousands of lives and billions of dollars. From Ankara's perspective, any Kurdish gain anywhere is a threat to their own territorial integrity. If the Kurds in Iran get autonomy, the Kurds in Turkey will want it too. Turkey has already established a "safe zone" in Northern Syria to break up Kurdish control there, and they have dozens of military bases in Northern Iraq.
So, if Turkey sees the Kurds mobilizing in Iran, do they intervene? Do they send their own troops across the border to make sure a Kurdish state doesn't emerge? That would turn a regional war into a continental catastrophe. You would have Turkey, a NATO member, potentially operating in a chaotic, post-regime Iran. It is a nightmare scenario for regional stability.
It is. Turkey has shown that they are perfectly willing to ignore international borders if they feel the Kurdish issue is getting out of hand. This is why the Kurds are so hesitant to be seen as the tip of the Israeli spear. If they become the face of the anti-regime movement, they might end up facing both the IRGC and the Turkish military at the same time. It is that classic geopolitical triangulation. They are stuck between Tehran, Ankara, and Tel Aviv, with Washington sitting somewhere in the distance, historically unreliable.
You mentioned the nineteen seventies earlier, and I think we should remind people about the Kissinger betrayal, because that really set the tone for the last fifty years of Kurdish diplomacy. It is the reason they are so cynical today.
This is one of the darkest chapters in American foreign policy. In the early nineteen seventies, the United States and the Shah of Iran were encouraging the Kurds in Iraq to rebel against the government in Baghdad. We gave them money, we gave them weapons, we promised we had their backs. But then, in nineteen seventy-five, the Shah and Saddam Hussein signed the Algiers Agreement. They settled their border disputes, and as part of the deal, the Shah agreed to stop supporting the Kurds.
And the United States just went along with it.
Within hours, the aid was cut off. The Iraqi army moved in, and the Kurdish rebellion was slaughtered. When Henry Kissinger was asked about it later, he famously said that covert action should not be confused with missionary work. That sentence is burned into the memory of every Kurdish political leader. They know that to the Great Powers, they are often just a convenient tool to be used and then discarded once the bigger deal is signed. We saw it again in twenty-nineteen when the U.S. pulled back from Northern Syria, leaving their Kurdish allies, the SDF, to face a Turkish invasion.
Which brings us back to today. Why would they trust Israel or the U.S. now? What is different in March of two thousand twenty-six?
I think the difference is the scale of the Iranian regime's vulnerability. In the past, the goal of the West was usually just to contain Iran or to use the Kurds as a nuisance to keep the regime distracted. But now, as we discussed in episode nine hundred thirty-one, we are looking at the potential dismantling of the entire IRGC structure. If the "Octopus" is actually dying, then the Kurds aren't just a tool anymore; they are a necessary part of whatever comes next. You cannot have a stable post-regime Iran without some kind of settlement with the Kurds, the Baluchis, and the other ethnic minorities.
That is a big "if," though. And it depends on the Kurds being able to overcome their own internal divisions. We have been talking about them as a monolith, but they are incredibly fractured. Even in the KRG in Iraq, you have the Barzani family in Erbil and the Talabani family in Sulaymaniyah, and they have literally fought civil wars against each other in the past.
That is the tragic irony of Kurdish politics. Their internal rivalries are often as intense as their fight for independence. The KDP in Erbil, led by the Barzanis, tends to be closer to Turkey and more cautious, while the PUK in Sulaymaniyah has historically had closer ties to Iran. If the Iranian regime starts to fall, these two factions might actually end up on opposite sides of the conflict. One might support the uprising in Iran, while the other tries to maintain stability to protect their trade routes.
So, when we look at the headlines saying Kurdish officials deny involvement, we have to ask: which officials? And which Kurds? The fighters in the mountains—the Peshmerga and the PJAK guerrillas—are almost certainly preparing for an offensive. The politicians in the villas in Erbil are almost certainly trying to negotiate a way to stay out of the crossfire.
And the people in the streets of Sanandaj and Mahabad in Iran are just waiting for the signal. This is why I think the silence is so important right now. In intelligence circles, they often say that the most important information is what is not being said. If the Kurds were truly neutral and had no intention of acting, they wouldn't need to issue these constant, forceful denials. The fact that they are so concerned with looking neutral tells you how high the stakes are.
It is also worth looking at the technical side of this. In episode nine hundred eighteen, we talked about Iran's solid fuel missile program and their strategic depth. The Zagros Mountains are where a lot of those underground missile bases are located. If the Kurds can seize even a few of those sites, or even just provide the coordinates for Israeli or American strikes, the regime's ability to retaliate against Israel evaporates.
That is a massive point, Corn. The Kurds are the ultimate human intelligence network. They live in the villages right next to these secret bases. They work in the support industries. They know where the tunnels are. If I am an Israeli military planner right now, my most valuable asset isn't a satellite or a stealth drone; it is a Kurdish shepherd with a satellite phone in the mountains of Kermanshah.
But that again puts a target on their backs. The IRGC knows this. They have been carrying out drone and missile strikes against Kurdish refugee camps in Iraq for years, claiming they are targeting "terrorist bases." If the Kurds move, the regime will likely use whatever is left of its arsenal to flatten Kurdish cities before the Israelis can finish them off. It is a terrifying gamble.
It is. And that is why I think we are seeing this "wait and see" approach. The Kurds are waiting for the tipping point. They are waiting for that moment when the regime's central command breaks down to the point where they can no longer coordinate a response. They are looking for the "Saddam moment" where the army just melts away.
So, for our listeners who are following the news every day, what should they be looking for? What are the indicators that the Kurdish silence is about to break?
There are three big things I am watching. First, keep an eye on the Turkish border. If you see the Turkish military start to move significant armor and air assets toward the Iranian border, it is a sign that their intelligence suggests a Kurdish mobilization is imminent. Ankara will move to block any attempt at creating a contiguous Kurdish zone.
Second, watch the rhetoric from the Iranian opposition groups in exile. If the main Persian opposition groups start making explicit promises about Kurdish autonomy in a future Iran, that is a signal that a deal has been struck. The Kurds won't move unless they have some guarantee that they won't just be trading one oppressor for another. They need to know that a post-mullah Iran won't just be another centralized, nationalist state that suppresses their language and culture.
And third, watch for "incidents" in the Zagros Mountains. Not full-scale battles, but small-scale sabotages of oil pipelines, communications towers, and IRGC supply lines. That is the classic precursor to a larger uprising. It is the Kurds testing the regime's reaction time and mapping out the vulnerabilities. If the regime takes three days to respond to a cut pipeline, the Kurds know they have the upper hand.
It is also worth mentioning that the Kurds are very savvy when it comes to social media and international PR. They know how to frame their struggle in a way that appeals to the West. During the fight against ISIS, they were the "brave secular allies" fighting against religious extremism. In the current conflict, they will frame themselves as the democratic, feminist alternative to the mullahs.
Which is a powerful narrative, especially here in Israel and in the United States. There is a lot of sympathy for the Kurds in the halls of power in Washington, even if it doesn't always translate into consistent policy. If they can convince the world that a Kurdish-led uprising is the quickest way to end the war and stabilize Iran, they might actually get the support they need this time. But we have to be realistic. The history of the Middle East is a graveyard of Kurdish hopes.
Every time they think they have found a reliable partner, the geopolitical winds shift and they are left standing alone. Whether it is the U.S. pulling out of Northern Syria in twenty-nineteen or the betrayal in nineteen seventy-five, the pattern is consistent. That is why I think their current strategy of "neutrality" is actually the most sophisticated one they have ever used. They are making everyone come to them. They are forcing Israel, the U.S., and even the Iranian opposition to prove that this time is different.
They aren't just jumping in because they are asked; they are waiting for the terms to be right. It is a high-stakes game of chicken with the entire region. If they wait too long, the opportunity passes and the regime might survive in some weakened but still oppressive form. If they move too soon, they face annihilation.
And let's not forget the humanitarian side of this. We are talking about millions of people who have already suffered through decades of war, displacement, and chemical weapons attacks, like the Halabja massacre in nineteen eighty-eight. If this war goes south for the Kurds, the scale of the tragedy would be unfathomable.
It is. But for many Kurds, the status quo is already a slow-motion tragedy. They are living under a regime that denies their language, executes their youth, and drains their resources. For them, the risk of war might be preferable to the certainty of continued oppression. As one Kurdish activist once said, "We are already dead in the eyes of the regime, so why not die for something that might actually matter?"
That is a heavy thought to end on, but I think it is the reality of the situation in March of two thousand twenty-six. We are looking at a people who have been pushed to the edge for a century, and they are finally seeing a crack in the wall. Whether they choose to run through that crack or wait for it to widen further is the decision that will define the next fifty years of the Middle East.
So, for everyone listening, don't just watch the missile counts. Watch the mountains. Watch the "stateless nation" that might just hold the key to the future of the Middle East. Their silence isn't a lack of interest; it is the sound of a very large engine warming up.
Well said, Herman. This has been a deep dive, and I feel like we have only scratched the surface. If you want to learn more about the Iranian regime's internal vulnerabilities, definitely check out episode nine hundred thirty-one. And if you want to understand the history of Israel's shadow war in the region, episode seven hundred thirty-eight is a great place to start.
And hey, if you are enjoying these deep dives into the weird and complex world of regional politics, please leave us a review on your podcast app or on Spotify. It really does help other people find the show. We have been doing this for nine hundred thirty-five episodes now, and the community we have built is what keeps us going.
You can find all our past episodes and a way to get in touch with us at our website, myweirdprompts.com. We have an RSS feed there for subscribers and we always love hearing your thoughts on these topics.
Thanks to Daniel for being our housemate and for usually sending us such great prompts, even though we hijacked the show today. We will be back to our regular format soon, but this was a conversation we just had to have.
Thanks for listening to My Weird Prompts. I am Corn Poppleberry.
And I am Herman Poppleberry. We will talk to you next time.
Stay curious, and keep watching the mountains. Goodbye for now.
